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The study explores whether blockchain technology can change the paradigm of the 
current financial structure and the balance of power in the international financial 
system. Accordingly, this study reviews the development of blockchain technology by 
analyzing China and Venezuela, both of which struggle to harness their technological 
advancement and to enhance their power in the international realm. We found that 
Venezuela invests in blockchain technology to create an alternative payment structure 
for survivability, while China’s desire is to become a global leader in global blockchain 
technology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is speculative to the extent that it seeks to account for some of the 
potential roles of blockchain technology in disrupting the current structure and 
balance of power in the international monetary order. ‘Blockchain’ is the latest 
technology to be labeled “dangerous” since the “true believers” in the technology 
“won’t stop until they’ve remade the world. Some of it will be thrilling. Some of 
it will keep us up at night” (Ford, 2018). Waking up to this reality, global firms 
are investing resources and energy into thinking about the impact of this on their 
own industries, from finance to artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, energy and 
cybersecurity. This is because it has the potential to disrupt what Howard Philip 
calls the coming era of ‘Pax Technica’ – an epoch of predictable stability based on 
known rules and expectations, while confirming his expectation that battles would 
continue to be waged between rival network infrastructure and norms of internet 
use (Howard, 2015). States are also increasingly evaluating how technology can be 
harnessed to increase their power in an international financial system dominated 
by a few (Ehrlich, 2018). Some, like Venezuela, seek to harness the technology to 
bypass economic sanctions, while bigger powers like China are more ambitious 
and pursue ways to accrue relative advantages over rivals in a fast-changing digital 
space (Ehrlich, 2018). In China today, a state increasingly investing in blockchain 
futures, this inability to control one application of a technology in the form of 
cryptocurrencies without taking down the entire internet is one of the Communist 
Party’s main concerns (Ehrlich, 2018).
In this paper, we investigate whether blockchain technology can change 
the paradigm of the current financial structure and the balance of power in the 
international financial system. Following this question, new solutions based 
on blockchain will also allow for new digital tools that challenge the current 
global hegemonies by opening up new spaces for the bypassing global financial 
institutions and the power of the hegemonic currencies to develop, thus giving 
greater influence to weaker and developing states like Venezuela. For states like 
China, research into blockchain technology is being aggressively pursued to gain 
relative advantages in the global financial system dominated by western actors. 
These two case studies are chosen because they represent arguably the biggest 
challenges to existing global financial orthodoxy, as in the case of China, and also 
the propensity of frequently maligned rogue regimes like Venezuela to seek out 
creative solutions to bypass sanctions and to maximize their power. 
This paper also opens a discussion on how the states, which have a different 
financial market structure, in regard to competitive market capacity as compared 
to their counterparts, are experiencing the blockchain development process. This 
is because China and Venezuela intend to take advantage of the greatest potential 
impact of blockchain technology on the traditional financial market (The People’s 
Bank of China, 2019). Although there are several studies on blockchain technology 
and individual investors, crypto enthusiasts’ investments and valuation of crypto-
assets in the crypto stock market, we still have very little understanding of how 
states with a different market structure in an international financial world are 
experiencing transformation and development of blockchain more systematically. 
For this reason, our study seeks to understand the development of the blockchain 
technology in states with different financial, social, and economic backgrounds, by 
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undertaking a comparative analysis of China and Venezuela. This study provides 
a deeper understanding of critical issues, opens up new directions and questions 
for future research, and perspectives based on the countries’ unique experiences 
and knowledge. 
Venezuela has a less competitive financial system relative to China’s. Besides, 
the country is battling hyperinflation and, thus, cash is useless in its current 
financial structure (Narayan, 2020)1. For instance, in 2020, a cup of coffee costs 
30,000 bolivars compared to 450 bolivars in 2019 (Laya and Yapur, 2020). Also, the 
bolivar depreciated by 99% against the US dollar in 2019 (Laya and Yapur, 2020). 
Because of these financial problems, Venezuelans are searching for alternative 
financial solutions more than ever, as an alternative survival strategy. Accordingly, 
Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, launched a national cryptocurrency 
called Petro in February 2018, which is backed by the country’s oil reserves, to gain 
confidence for economic growth (Samson, 2018). On the contrary, China, even as 
one of the most powerful and largest developing countries in the world, embraced 
blockchain technology to circumvent current financial systemic restrictions and to 
become the global leader in blockchain technology (Manganiello, 2019). Both China 
and Venezuela desire to fend off current financial system restrains by investing in 
digital cryptocurrencies, albeit they do not have similar characteristics, standards, 
market structure, and the scope of power in developing blockchain technology. 
Both cases show that, even though blockchain technology is in its nascent stage, 
applications of blockchain technology in finance and trade have the potential 
of altering global financial transactions among the countries. Accordingly, 
these observations raise the following questions: What is the intrinsic value of 
cryptocurrencies? Why do countries invest in blockchain technology? What 
frictions make individuals more confident in encrypted currencies rather than fiat 
money backed by governments/states? What policies and initiatives strengthen 
the potential impact of blockchain technology in the financial technology space? 
In this study, we address these questions using theories and empirical examples.
This study primarily extends the literature on adopting a realist international 
financial framework for analysis based on attempts by states to maximize their 
power in the international realm. One of the main departures of our examination 
from the literature is to understand concepts about cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
technology and their provisions in the global financial system. Before analyzing our 
cases (China and Venezuela), we underlie concepts under blockchain technology 
in detail. Since blockchain technology has many sophisticated terms and concepts, 
underlying fundamental characteristics of blockchain technology will permit us 
better understand the logic of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies. When 
concepts and terms regarding blockchain become clear, the contribution of the 
study will be better perceived. Accordingly, this study is organized as follows. We 
first consider three initial ways to think about blockchain technology and its impact 
on the global financial order: (i) one is through cryptocurrencies and (ii) two is its 
impact on global trade. We then look specifically at how China and Venezuela 
are approaching the blockchain technology. Finally, we complete with some other 
1 The current COVID-19 pandemic, which has disrupted global economies and financial markets (see 
Iyke, 2020; Narayan, 2020; Sharma, 2020), will only worsen Venezuela’s economy.
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preliminary thoughts on how blockchain technologies may be harnessed and 
(mis)used by states.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING TECHNOLOGY AS POWER 
Technology has always been thought of as part of the panoply of resources a state 
has in its inventory to reach its desired goals. These goals have been stated in the 
literature to be aimed at security and power in a world thought to be guided by 
shifts in balances of power (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979, 2000). States jostle for 
influence in an anarchical international system bereft of hard and fast rules about 
how best to secure your survival and, more importantly, in the absence of one 
rule enforcer that can ensure peace (Mearsheimer, 2001). Might is right in a game 
of survival and any military or technological advantage, which can be gained in 
securing your interests is a rational response necessary to achieve this. Though 
neoliberal scholars contend that such anarchy can be ‘tamed’, through cooperation, 
international organizations and trade that bind states together, even here the focus 
is on maximizing gains but not in a winner takes all (relative) gains scenario but 
in terms of absolute gains that foster cooperation (Martin and Simmons, 1998). To 
become powerful states must maintain independence in strategic areas like the 
economy. Our research shows how states like China and Venezuela have reacted 
to the potentials offered by blockchain technology, suggesting that they are very 
much in search of relative advantages in their aggressive pursuit of solutions to 
evade what they see as the unfair ‘rules of the game’ imposed by existing global 
structures. Blockchain technology offers them a chance to bypass some of these 
rules, create new ones and reap the rewards of early adoption. 
It is useful here to clarify how we understood technology, since concepts frame 
things, giving definitions and meanings to ideas and allowing us to speak to each 
other to better understand how social, political and economic processes evolve. 
An important introduction to how we should think about technology comes from 
Charles Singer and his masterful multi-volume work, A History of Technology where 
he attempts to understand technology as “how things are commonly done or made 
… (and) what things are done or made” (Singer et al., 1979). Similarly, others have 
argued that “broadly speaking, technology is the way people do things” (White, 
1940). Therefore, we can settle for a definition of technology as centering on “‘how 
humans do things’ or, ‘how humans get things done.” (Dator et al., 2015). We 
should appreciate here that any changes in the way humans do things or how they 
get things done presently is of interest to a broad array of scholars: sociologists and 
their attempts to explain a change in society, historians and their concern for the 
past and its present implications, economists, too, but also political scientists and 
their concern for power. It is these last two aspects that we focus on in this study. 
To be clear, states have always taken a keen interest in technological change and 
its implications for their rule, whether local or international (Andreas and Price, 
2001). States invest billions every year to gain military-technical superiority over 
rivals and increasingly to surveil their own populations as policing is increasingly 
militarized in part to the transference of military technology to the former (Andreas 
and Price, 2001). This is because technology has always presented opportunities 
and challenges to social, political and economic structures throughout history. 
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This has led to many critics, notably Heidegger who argued in his influential 
critique The Question Concerning Technology that “everywhere we remain unfree 
and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it” (Heidegger, 
1977). It was, he argued, only by recognizing its danger that we can ‘escape this 
bondage’ (see Blitz, 2014).2 In more extreme cases, people like Kaczynski (1995), 
the infamous ‘Unabomber’ who ran a bombing campaign across the US between 
1978 and 1995, argued that technology was wrecking horror on mankind and 
needed to be stopped by any means necessary.
Technology is often charged with disrupting the world: criminals’, the 
military’s and militants’ use of the internet continues to be a major theme when 
discussing technological revolution (Cleaver, 1998). Consider, for example, the 
United Kingdom’s National Security Capability Review in 2018, which made wide 
references to cybercrimes—that is, innovative ways to disrupt social, political and 
economic systems through the internet—as needing urgent investigation since 
threats which were materializing quicker than had been imagined in an earlier 
review by the same organization. Technology is thus thought about in terms of 
power gains, relative advantages and risks. 
That technology companies and those who fund them have always thought 
about such linkages between technology and power is readily apparent if we look 
at the history regarding how the internet came into being. The US military, for 
example, helped fund the technology, which eventually gave us the internet in 
part to its interest in advanced communication tools (Naughton, 2016). Moreover, 
US agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security 
Agency heavily backed the now global corporation, Google, in its start-up to 
retain intelligence superiority over its rivals (Ahmed, 2015). The fruits of this 
were deployed in Iraq and elsewhere. The internet infrastructure has given rise 
to other technologies, which have profoundly shaped, or disrupted if you like, 
our world: Google, Facebook, Twitter, PayPal and many others. Moreover, it has 
allowed for new security threats to emerge thanks to its transformative impact on 
communications and the ability for group mobilization (Cleaver, 1998).
III. STATED AND BLOCKCHAIN 
A. Analysis by States
We investigate the blockchain development process in two countries: China and 
Venezuela. We choose China because its growth rate in science, technology and 
economy even in the nascent term of blockchain technology is more expeditious 
as compared to other developing countries. China is important because of its 
massive economic power (with its global companies in the top ten of Fortune 500), 
its dynamic youth population density, its global ambitions, and its early massive 
investment in researching blockchain potentials (Wang et. al., 2019). On the other 
hand, Venezuela is an interesting case because it is subject to sanctions by the both 
the US and the European Union (EU), who together lead global financial flows; 
Venezuela has worked hard over the past decade to evade these sanctions and 
2 Source: https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/understanding-heidegger-on-technology 
accessed on 05 August 2020.
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most recently turned to blockchain technology (Karsten and West, 2018) and thus 
presenting an intriguing insight into current and potential future trends. People, 
who are living in Venezuela, are seeking alternative payment methods to be able 
to integrate themselves into the global financial system against international 
economic sanctions. Meanwhile, endless financial crises in Venezuela inspired 
people to search for crypto-assets as an alternative payment tool to sustain their 
survivability. Regarding these underlying facts in today’s modern financial 
structure, we extended our study by analyzing China’s and Venezuela’s blockchain 
developments. Although their challenges and strategies to compete against other 
financial systems appear quite distinct from each other, the remedy that they 
applied for their financial empowerment is alike, which is blockchain technology. 
A1. China
China is proactively carving out a sphere for itself in the digital sphere to enhance 
its status as a great power. Indeed, achieving such a status is acknowledged 
domestically as requiring military power, but also that “marketization, 
revolutionary advances in information technology, and internationalization are 
becoming the foundations of national strength” (Rozman, 1999). It is precisely this 
advancement in information technology, which is today a key aspect of China’s 
march towards global authority, while much of the literature tends to focus 
on domestic attempts to control its population via advanced technology. The 
contours of this quest for power go much further, especially in its bid to carve out 
a sphere of influence in the digital sphere as a necessary addition to its military 
and economic might. Indeed, China initially accepted the wave of globalization in 
the 1990s as a necessary part of its own development quest, but soon realized it 
was a “double-edge sword” that, if mismanaged “could very well derail China’s 
quest for great-power status” (Deng and Moore, 2004). Events like the Asian 
financial crises between 1997 and 1998 “reinforced suspicion that the United 
States and Japan seek every opportunity for strategic gain, even in ostensibly 
economic matters” and the “severe imbalances and inequalities” that persisted in 
the international system (Narayan, 2020). Beijing, moreover, “did not see itself as 
immune to the vagaries and injustices associated with contemporary international 
economic elations”, according to Deng and Moore (2004). At the same, China also 
aggressively sought to promote its economic ties with African and Latin American 
states and to provide an indirect contest to the US efforts to build a global liberal 
order that caters for its national interests (Breslin, 2016). Considering these national 
self-interests, China seeks to salvage its economy from orthodox financial system 
regulations by empowering its blockchain economy by focusing on two main 
areas: 1) Empowering blockchain enterprises and blockchain projects led by the 
Chinese government, and 2) prioritizing research and development to empower 
China’s blockchain development.
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A2. Blockchain Enterprises and Blockchain Projects Led by Chinese Government
Financial risks and opportunities – and a keen eye for how these relate to its power 
globally – have pushed China to invest heavily in blockchain research, especially 
as this relates to overcoming the current dollar-dominated financial system’s 
inherent restrictions (Zhao, 2018). Assessing China’s initiatives and eagerness to 
explore decentralized cryptocurrencies is worthwhile in terms of appreciating the 
country’s future economic course in its international financial agenda. 
China has already made a distinguished name for itself in the business sphere 
for its powerful technological firms and advanced digital payment systems. The 
rise of firms like Huawei and its role in bringing advanced 5G technology to global 
consumers shows how Chinese companies have both managed to gain a foothold 
in international markets (Hooker and Palumbo, 2019).
Accordingly, epitomizing the role China has assigned to blockchain research, 
China’s Central Bank (PBoC) has funded an advanced research group in 2016 for 
national digital currency to scrutinize the strategic objectives of digital currencies 
and initial coin offerings by connecting with specialists of Citibank and Deloitte 
(The People’s Bank of China, 2019). PBoC’s main objective is to decrease operating 
costs, gain greater efficiency and to check for unlawful money flows (Das, 2016). 
Fan Yifei, the vice governor of the PBoC indicated that PBoC’s main agenda is 
going to be concentrated on digital currency and development to guarantee the 
empowerment of the Chinese yuan in the international financial system (The 
People’s Bank of China, 2019). The consolidation of China’s national currency is 
a strategic priority, which the country hopes will provide leverage against the 
US dollar (Zhao, 2018). PBoC research centered on new cryptocurrencies and 
blockchain technology and is already a work in progress; China is poised to 
emerge as a pioneer for these innovations in a supervisory role (Campbell, 2016). 
This will involve their own private encrypted currencies and creating digital legal 
tenders of their own (Campbell, 2016).
Additionally, reports from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a top 
government think tank, argue that digital currencies as an international payment 
system should be adopted by central banks to decrease transaction time and costs 
(Reuters, 2018). Zhou Xiaochuan, who was the governor of the People’s Bank of 
China, affirmed that digital currencies have practical revolutionary functions as 
a payment system in terms of their speed, reliability and inexpensiveness.3 To 
set up cryptocurrencies for financial regulations, Fan Yifei, a vice central bank 
governor has offered a strategic policy for China to carry a two-tier system, which 
consists of the central bank and financial institutions as a legitimate issuer.4 All in 
all, China’s Central Bank is in the process of integrating its financial system into 
the blockchain economy to protect its national currency and diversify its financial 
revenues against dollarization.
Looking at the last couple of years of research by People’s Bank of China 
and at China’s latest blockchain projects, it can be observed that China conducts 
3 Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-09/cash-may-disappear-in-china-as-
payments-go-digital-pboc-says?utm_content=crypto&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_
source=twitter&utm_medium=social accessed on 05 August 2020.
4 Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-crytocurrency-cenbank/central-banks-should-
consider-using-digital-currencies-china-think-tank-idUSKBN1FR0ZL accessed on 05 August 2020.
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a real-world pilot project. It is backed by the government in different major 
cities in Shenzhen, Suzhou, Chengdu, and Xiong. This new currency is tested 
it in these specific locations before introducing it to the public with the aim of 
altering paper money and coins in circulation. Limiting this project to the urban 
cities allows China to monitor its impact on the public in a more manageable way. 
Different from other blockchain projects, the PBOC’s main aim is not to create 
a decentralized cryptographic financial system. On the contrary, PBOC’s main 
aim is to generate a highly centralized digital financial system under its control 
by removing intermediaries in the system (Jia, 2020). Accordingly, China’s other 
latest blockchain project is Blockchain-based Service Network (BSN) as initiated 
in April 2020 in Beijing (Wang et. al., 2019). In this network, Chinese state officials 
provide an integrated global infrastructure for enterprises to be able to generate 
new blockchain applications in a less costly way (Wang et. al., 2019). For this 
project, China Mobile, China Union Pay, and Huobi China worked together with 
the intent to bolster the digital economy for developers from all around the world. 
BSN is a global project as a national priority, which Xi Jinping (the country’s 
leader) desires to open the doors to the world technology giants to catch their 
investments in China (Stockton, 2020). 
More specifically, we can extend China’s new developments by looking at 
the country’s intellectual property output in statistics. For instance, patents are 
very important indicators of creativity of the companies, especially for innovative 
technology. Statistically, when we consider China’s number of patents, there 
are more than 10,000 blockchain-based patent applications in China National 
Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) (World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2020). Meanwhile, China applied the highest patent cooperation 
treaty applications in 2019 (Figure 2). Alibaba has been ranked first, in terms of 
patent applications, having applied for 543 patents (World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2020). Secondly, Unicom, which is a state-own telecom company 
has 214 patents (Forkast, 2020). Hence, given these examples, we can state that 
China encourages enterprises to produce more innovative and creative blockchain 
projects in global standards, even though they have strict economic regulations 
for investors and they banned cryptocurrencies in 2017 to control non-regulative 
crypto projects (Seth, 2019).
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A3. The Role of Research and Development in China’s Blockchain Development
Each country should make its cost–benefit and SWOT analysis to fabricate true and 
original innovation instead of copying others based on their own technological 
and financial requirements in their financial agenda. To do this, academic scholars, 
high-tech engineers, statisticians, and mathematicians play a crucial role in 
increasing the quality of research and development. As can be seen in Table 1, 
China has advantageous soft power in terms of high-yielding research institutions 
in global blockchain research. Accordingly, Chinese institutions and pundits have 
distinguished success; more than half of Chinese research institutions have been 
ranked in the top 20 world research institutions studying blockchain (Wang et al., 
2020). 
Figure 1.
International Patent Applications by Country














List of Top 20 World Research Institutions Studying Blockchain
The table shows the top 20 world research institutions. The list is taken from Wang et al., (2020).
Research İnstitutions Full Name Countries
Beijing Univ Posts & 
Telecommunications Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications China
Chinese Acad Sci Chinese Academy of Science China
CSIRO Austrian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization Australia
Univ Elect Sci & Technol 
China
China University of Electronic Science and 
Technology China
Tsinghua Univ Tsinghua University China
Beihang Univ Beihang University China
Nanyang Technol Univ Nanyang Technological University Singapore
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Research İnstitutions Full Name Countries
Xidian Univ Xidian University of Electronic Technology China
Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ Shanghai Jiao Tong University China
IBM Res IBM Research USA
Univ Chinese Acad Sci University of Chinese Academy of Sciences China
Natl Univ Def Technol National University of Defence Technology China
UCL University of London England
Univ Sydney University of Sydney Australia
Peking Univ Peking University China
Sun Yat Sen Univ Sun Yat-sen University China
Univ Cagliari University of Cagliari Italy
Guangdong Univ Technol Guangdong University of Technology China
Natl Univ Singapore National University of Singapore Singapore
Univ Texas San Antonio University of Texas at San Antonio USA
Furthermore, World Bank’s statistics show that China has upgraded its gross 
domestic expenditure on research and development projects, which comprise 
experimental development, applied and basic researches, from 1996 to 2018 (Wang 
et al., 2020). Besides, China supports its intellectuals, pundits, and researchers 
through subsidies to enable them catch up their global counterparts (Wang et al., 
2020). 
Besides, the Chinese government has released its 15-year blueprint in 2020, 
which announces the country’s global technological advancement agenda 
(World Intellectual Property Organization, 2020). In this initiative, China’s 
main motivation is to build a resilient technological system against conflicts and 
ambiguities for future technologies including blockchain (Wanxiang Blockchain 
Labs, 2019). As reported by the Lagou Institute of Big Data research, currently 86% 
of the employees who are working in Chinese institutions are identified as suitable 
candidates for future jobs (Tran, 2020). Hence, there will be a sizeable talent gap in 
China, which is statistically reported as 4.2 million people at the end of 2020 (Tran, 
2020). Therefore, to empower China’s technological infrastructure, the country is 
preparing its institutions by reducing the talent gap between required positions 
and talented experts who can professionally adapt to the next creative disruptive 
technologies and to manage risky circumstances for the long-term technological 
projects (Tran, 2020). For instance, a diversified network of universities and 
incubators are playing a pivotal role in their development agenda (Tran, 2020). 
To reduce the talent gap, not only are they creating a diversified network in 
universities and incubators in various centers but China is also constructing 
blockchain laboratories and hackathons that provide more dynamic, innovative and 
explorative communities within these institutions (Manganiello, 2019). Concerning 
this aim, some of the recent global blockchain events that happened during the 
Shanghai International Blockchain Week 2019—Hackathon (on 14-15 September), 
Demo day for global projects and the 5th (16 September) Global Blockchain Summit 
(17-18 September)— prove China’s endeavors in this way (Wanxiang Blockchain 
Table 1.
List of Top 20 World Research Institutions Studying Blockchain (Continued)
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Labs, 2019). The world’s best blockchain teams came together from various sectors 
and shared their vision, potential impacts, applications and relatively competitive 
goals with other teams and quests (Wanxiang Blockchain Labs, 2019). 
Considering all these, China gave importance to the interactions and 
collaborations among scientists and entrepreneurs within a diversified network 
of universities and incubators. When China adapt its institutions to more 
innovative and durable places in global and more advanced standards against 
the future potential creative destructive technologies, resorting to science will 
give the country power to promote consensus among politicians, entrepreneurs 
and intellectuals in a more rational and systematic thinking way. Hence, this will 
create a more innovative and dynamic atmosphere where people can share their 
experience contribute to China’s economic growth in a less costly and efficient 
way. The research and developments in their diversified network also provide 
institutions long-term survivability even in risky and financial crises times. 
B. Venezuela 
Unlike China, Venezuela has since 2010 plunged into a major economic crisis, 
compounded by domestic infighting between the socialist government of first, 
Hugo Chavez and, then, Nicolás Maduro and the opposition (Laya and Yapur, 
2020). Hyperinflation and food shortages, on top of the country’s inability to engage 
fully in international financial markets due to US sanctions, have hit the country 
hard Berman, A. (2018). Like China, Venezuela has also invested in blockchain 
research to alleviate what it believes is an unfair economic system holding back 
its progress.
Venezuela is primarily interested in blockchain to create a new digital currency 
to raise global funds, bypass US and EU sanctions and offer an alternative to its 
domestic currency, the bolívar (Karsten and West, 2018). To this end, the country 
launched its own cryptocurrency called petro in 2018 (Berman, 2018). The aim 
was to attract foreign investors, who could not have approached the country via 
conventional means, and, in the end, it raised $700 million in its initial offering 
(Berman 2018). Venezuela has also vowed to “that it will accept Petros as a form of 
payment of national taxes, fees, contributions and public services” (Samson, 2018). 
Via initial coin offerings, the state was able to raise money and bypass international 
banking restrictions. This follows intense research by other countries, most 
notably, Sweden and its central bank, Sveriges Riksbank (2019), about the viability 
of releasing an ‘e-krona’, which would be equivalent to its regular currency 
(Sveriges, 2019). In Venezuela’s case, the country petro is begged to the price of 
oil in a bid to lure investors and raise foreign currency supplies (Browne, 2018).
Sensing the dangers, the influential US-based Brookings Institution released a 
report deriding this development, arguing that “it is relatively unsurprising that 
a dictatorship with little reserve currency … has resorted to a deceitful means like 
introducing the petro ... [t]he petro … exists to create foreign currency reserves 
from thin air” (Karsten and West, 2018). Going forward there is the very real 
prospect here for other states to follow suit and “create a cryptocurrency tied to a 
government-controlled asset, raise money in violation of sanctions, and proceed 
to manipulate that cryptocurrency’s value to maximizing profit” as Karsten and 
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West (2018) argued at the center for Technology Innovation. Cryptos thus erode 
the power of sanctions by exploiting the newness of the technology and potential 
ambiguities.
Recognizing how this technology weakens its power to punish what it 
considers rogue elements in the international system, US financial regulators 
began considering taking ownership of the petro coin illegal due to sanctions and 
noted that “in light of recent actions taken by the Maduro regime to attempt to 
circumvent U.S. sanctions by issuing a digital currency in a process that Venezuela’s 
democratically elected National Assembly has denounced as unlawful, hereby 
order as follows: Section 1. (a) All transactions related to, provision of financing 
for, and other dealings in, by a United States person or within the United States, 
any digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on 
behalf of the Government of Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018, are prohibited 
as of the effective date of this order.”5 It can be said that the current economic 
woes impacting Venezuela due largely to a worthless national currency, the lack 
of financial services, hyperinflation rates and the massive national debt have 
pushed the government to create alternative payment tools to fend off financial 
and political sanctions that the US has imposed on it.
By harnessing the power of blockchain, Venezuela was able to create a new 
instrument to bypass existing financial systems. Petro thus became the first formal 
cryptocurrency in this ecosystem. Despite its obvious failures – low uptake from 
citizens, for example – other efforts were made to stabilize and take control of 
the worsening economy, including revamping petro coin’s functions (Berman 
2018). For example, a new petro public sale began on November 5, 2018, as stated 
by Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro on national television (Berman, 2018). 
The differences between the revamped and old petro is that the newest one is not 
going to be backed just by oil but by 10% diamond, 20% gold, 20% iron and 50% 
oil resources (Berman, 2018). This will help to remove one of the key concerns 
for cryptocurrency investors, which is price volatility. In a bid to further force 
citizens to use the coin, an updated white paper stated that in the future passports 
in Venezuela can only be purchased with the revamped petro and it will cost 7.200 
bolivars (equivalent to two crypto petros).6 
Acutely aware of their subordinate position in an international system 
dominated largely by actors who sanctioned it and with an increasingly hostile 
regional environment, Venezuela has sought to create solutions to bypass 
financial systems entirely. The Venezuelan government is in search of alternative 
payment systems to save their country from the intensifying economic meltdown, 
humanitarian crises and to circumvent US sanctions (Karsten and West 2018).). 
Petro, as a decentralized cryptocurrency, is pitched as a legal substitute for dollars. 
Practically speaking though, only time will tell us how successful petro can be in 
recovering Venezuela from the current deep economic crises it is mired in. Doubts 
remain, however, about its viability owing to its centralized (state) nature making 
5 Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-taking-additional-steps-
address-situation-venezuela/ accessed on 05 August 2020
6 More information, see: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-05/crypto-now-the-only-
way-isolated-venezuelans-can-buy-passports accessed on 05 August 2020.
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it just as suspicious for Venezuelans as the practically useless official currency, 
the bolivar. Yet, this does not mean the end of blockchain or cryptocurrencies in 
the country. Venezuelans continue to trade massively in bitcoins, especially as 
economic conditions worsen.7 The US Treasury Department was so alarmed by the 
financing of petro that it recently put Moscow based Evrofinance Mosnarbank on 
its sanctions list for helping Venezuela in this (Mohsin, 2019). Still, many obstacles 
remain for Venezuela, however, and it is clear from the petro case that for economic 
reconstruction or remodeling programs of this scale, much of the groundwork – 
educating citizens for one – is required beforehand. The more people are educated, 
the more petro can be used more efficiently. In addition to this, the government 
still must overcome any negative perceptions among the public. Only then can the 
petro be accepted more widely.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we offered a preliminary analysis of what blockchain technology is 
and what some of its applications may be and the implications for the international 
financial system, specifically the quest for power. We argued that the technology, 
due to its emphasis on secure peer-to-peer (decentralized) systems, could radically 
alter key industries in finance. Besides, the technology has broader implications 
for how states manage the internet. Based on current literature trends, blockchain 
is seen as either a nightmare—the ability of a massive, public listing of all our 
transactions—or a liberating tool that can free people from the rigid governing 
structures currently structuring our increasingly digital lives. From finance to 
artificial intelligence and global financial systems, global conglomerates and states 
will continue experimenting with this technology in the coming years.
Although a large theoretical literature exists on the blockchain and other 
innovative technologies, relatively little research focuses on a comparative cross-
country analysis of blockchain development and especially concentrating on 
China and Venezuela, two countries with relatively different competitive market 
structures and scope of power in international finance. In this study, seizing a 
realist international financial framework, we explored Venezuela and China’s 
attempt to utilize the new technology to maximize their powers and fend off the 
current international financial system’s limitations. Exclusively, we examined 
the importance of research and development alongside real-world blockchain 
enterprises and blockchain projects supported by the Chinese government in 
China’s blockchain development. The coexistence of public and private blockchain 
projects, which are fortified by scientific evidence, gives China endurance and 
power for its institutions in the development of blockchain technology. We 
document that China’s main aim is opening the country’s doors to the world’s 
global leaders in the innovative sector, albeit it strictly regulates its local firms and 
enterprises. Likewise, China supports its scientists, entrepreneurs and state officials 
to enhance themselves to global standards. Accordingly, these actors created 
platforms of diversified networks in universities, research institutions and global 
7 Source: https://dailyhodl.com/2019/02/23/venezuelan-says-bitcoin-and-crypto-are-keeping-his-
family-alive-as-crisis-grows-increasingly-violent/ accessed on 05 August 2020.
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blockchain summits located in China to share their knowledge and experiences 
simultaneously. China has already invested significantly in this endeavor, despite 
its massive economic and technological base, while Venezuela – beset by economic 
crises and a powerful foe in the form of the US – is also seeking ways to bypass the 
dollar-based financial order utilizing a national cryptocurrency of its own. Hence, 
Venezuela does not have systemic and corporate financial blockchain developments 
as does China. Both countries’ main purpose is to create an alternative financial 
system for their survivability. In both cases, this exciting new technology has the 
potential to revolutionize the way global financial transactions are processed. 
Hence, Venezuela and China are trying to create their own alternative realities by 
courtesy of blockchain technology’s creative destruction power and adopting a 
realist international realm.
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